by Georgia Center for Opportunity | Apr 27, 2015
This is the third entry in a series of posts highlighting GCO’s report, A High Price to Pay: Recommendations for Minimizing Debt’s Role in Driving Recidivism Rates. The first entry provided an overview of the report and the second entry laid out causes of debt for people reentering society from prison.
An inordinate amount of debt and unrealistic terms of repayment create numerous barriers for returning citizens, including disproportionate financial pressure, the threat of revocation and re-incarceration, and various penalties for non-compliance.
Mounting Financial Pressure
Having to immediately begin paying financial obligations upon release combined with carrying thousands of dollars in debt puts tremendous financial pressure on returning citizens. Many leave prison with great anxiety wondering where they will live and work, and some possess only what they were given upon release: $25, a change of civilian clothes, and a bus ticket to their release destination.[i] A great number of returning citizens do not have a decent-paying job prior to prison,[1],[ii] and their prospect of finding one after release is slim.[iii] One study reveals that three-fourths of people released from prison owing child support, restitution, and supervision fees reported having difficulty paying off these debts.[iv] They may be willing to make these payments but simply do not have the means to do so right away.
Threat of Revocation or Arrest
The payment of debts and obligations is a condition of probation and parole in Georgia;[v] therefore, a violation of these conditions by failing to pay can result in a revocation hearing.[vi] While it is not common practice for the Parole Board to revoke a parolee solely for his or her failure to pay financial obligations,[vii] in some jurisdictions revocation hearings are regularly sought for those on probation.[viii] One public defender in Georgia reports that probationers who cannot pay criminal justice debt are often arrested for failing to report to officers who are involved in collection.[ix] This may not result in re-incarceration, but it may cause a person to miss work and subsequently lose his or her job. However, those who fail to appear at a payment hearing can have a warrant issued for their arrest.[x] Further, Georgia law requires a person to remain under probation supervision until all outstanding obligations are paid, or until the termination of the sentence, depending on whichever comes first.[xi]
Penalties for Non-Compliance
For those who do not pay court-ordered financial obligations and debt, Georgia law allows for garnishment, levy, foreclosure, and all other actions provided for the collection of fines, costs, and restitution.[xii] This can be detrimental for a returning citizen who is struggling to make ends meet. Unpaid debt also may lead to the suspension of one’s driver’s license, making transportation to and from work very challenging, since Georgia law allows for the suspension of a driver’s license for any person who has accumulated child support arrears equivalent to or greater than two months’ worth of payments.[2],[xiii] This barrier can impede a person’s ability to find work and earn income, leading to more and more debt accumulating. In addition, criminal justice debt can be converted into a civil judgment which allows credit reporting agencies access to the information. This in turn damages – or further damages – a returning citizen’s credit, making it more difficult to obtain employment and housing.[xiv]
A combination of these barriers may lead a returning citizen to become desperate and resort to engaging in the underground economy as a means of supporting himself or herself, or paying his or her debts.[xv] As a result, the returning citizen may face re-incarceration for committing new offenses,[xvi] leading to more debt accumulation and increased costs to taxpayers.
Footnotes
[1] Fifty-nine percent of people detained in jails across the nation in 2002 reported monthly incomes of less than $1,000 prior to arrest.
[2] Suspending and reinstating driver’s licenses is an administrative process that is handled by the DCSS.
Endnotes
Some of the citations listed below are abbreviated. To view the full citation, see the “Notes” section in our report, A High Price to Pay.
[i] Laurie Linke and Peggy Ritchie, Releasing Inmates from Prison: Profiles of State Practices, U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections, September 2004, 25, https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/,76 (tution Procedures,”Library/ 021386.pdf.
[ii] Doris J. James, Profile of Jail Inmates, 2002, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 201932, July 2004, revised October 12, 2004, 9, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf.
[iii] Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Naomi Sugie, “Sequencing Disadvantage: Barriers to Employment Facing Young Black and White Men with Criminal Records,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 623 (2009): 195-213, National Institutes of Health Public Access, Author Manuscript, available in PMC February 27, 2013, 4, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3583356/.
[iv] Rachel L. McLean and Michael D. Thompson, Repaying Debts, 8; Nancy G. La Vigne, Christy Visher, and Jennifer Castro, Chicago Prisoners’ Experiences Returning Home, Urban Institute, December 2004, 10, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311115_ChicagoPrisoners.pdf.
[v] Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt, 21, endnote 118; Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, “Parole Conditions,” accessed July 24, 2014, http://pap.georgia.gov/parole-conditions.
[vi] Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt, 25.
[vii] Robert Keller, Deputy Director of the Governor’s Office of Transition, Support, and Reentry, email message to author, April 1, 2014.
[viii] Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt, 21, endnote 119.
[ix] Ibid., endnote 145; See Telephone Interview with Nick White, Defender, Houston County Pub. Defender Office, Nov. 6, 2009.
[x] Ibid.
[xi] O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a)(2): “Probation supervision shall terminate in all cases no later than two years from the commencement of probation supervision unless specially extended or reinstated by the sentencing court upon notice and hearing and for good cause shown; provided, however, in those cases involving the collection of fines, restitution, or other funds, the period of supervision shall remain in effect for so long as any such obligation is outstanding, or until termination of the sentence, whichever first occurs.”
[xii] Ibid., endnote 196. See O.C.G.A § 17-10-20(c): “Fines and restitution can be collected through levy, foreclosure, garnishment, and all other actions provided for the enforcement of judgments in Georgia”; See O.C.G.A.§ 42-8-34.2(a) “authorizing the collection of ‘arrearage . . . through issuance of a writ of fiera facias’ from defendants for whom payment of fines, costs, and restitution is a condition of probation. However, no one the Brennan Center interviewed knew of wage garnishment or liens being used in practice.”
[xiii] O.C.G.A. § 19-6-28.1(b); Tina Brooks, Parental Accountability Court Coordinator for the Flint Judicial Circuit, email message to the author, July 31, 2014.
[xiv] Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt, 27; See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-20(a): “In any case in which a fine or restitution is imposed as part of the sentence, such fine and restitution shall constitute a judgment against the defendant”; Jonathan D. Glater, “Another Hurdle for the Jobless: Credit Inquiries,” New York Times, August 6, 2009, accessed April 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/business/07credit.html? pagewanted=all&_r=0.
[xv] Kirsten D. Levingston and Vicki Turetsky, “Debtors’ Prison – Prisoners’ Accumulation of Debt as a Barrier to Reentry,” Clearinghouse Review Journal of Poverty Law and Policy 41 (2007): 188, http://www.clasp.org/docs/ 0394.pdf.
[xvi] Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt, 24.
by Georgia Center for Opportunity | Apr 24, 2015
Today, poor children in America have a limited shot at moving up the economic ladder into the middle or upper class. A study in 2012 by the Pew Charitable Trust shows that “[t]hose born at the top and bottom of the income ladder are likely to stay there as adults.” Further, “More than 40 percent of Americans raised in the bottom quintile of the family income ladder remain stuck there as adults, and 70 percent remain below the middle.”
In terms of economic mobility, America is losing its identity as the “land of opportunity.”
In January 2014, Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez, economists from Harvard and Berkeley, released a study with interesting insights regarding this issue of upward mobility. Their study explores community characteristics that foster upward mobility for lower-income children. The study measures two outcomes: absolute mobility, or the way children progress up the income ladder into adulthood, and relative mobility, or the income disparity between children who grew up rich and poor in the same community as they reach adulthood.
The researchers in the study looked at households in “commuting zones,” or what are basically metropolitan areas, in order to compare the economic mobility of children in various communities. Interestingly, they found that kids who grow up in certain metropolitan areas are far more likely to climb into the top two-fifths of American household income distribution than kids from families with the same relative income from other metropolitan areas. This led them to look into what the specific community factors are that foster opportunity. Their research reveals some very telling patterns:
1. Family Structure
The single most important factor in communities that foster economic mobility is family structure. Chetty et al. found that children raised in communities with high percentages of single mothers are significantly less likely to achieve both absolute and relative mobility. As such, “[c]hildren of married parents…have higher rates of upward mobility if they live in communities with fewer single parents.”
What makes this finding particularly significant is that this is the first major study showing that rates of single parenthood at the community level are linked to children’s economic prospects over the course of their lives. Previous research has shown that children raised by two married parents are significantly more likely to climb the income ladder, but this is the first serious study to show that lower-income kids from both single and married-parent families are more likely to flourish if they are in a community with high shares of two-parent families.
2. Racial & Economic Segregation
Second, they found that children raised in communities that are racially and economically segregated – that is, communities that cluster lots of poor kids together – are less likely to achieve economic mobility. In fact, segregation and family structure are the only two community characteristics that had a consistent correlation with upward mobility in their study.
It is helpful to think of racial and economic segregation as isolation – that is marginalization from both the mainstream economy and the norms that allow middle-income people to flourish. These norms are often contagions that go unnoticed and unmentioned in middle-to-upper-class communities. What is missing for so many children stuck in cycles of poverty is social inclusion, which overlaps with the third factor.
3. Social Capital
Social Capital often goes unmentioned in conversations about economic mobility because it is so difficult to capture in social-scientific terms. Moreover, social capital highlights how complex and connected poverty is because it cannot be separated out from other community factors. The methodology of social scientists encourages that complex problems be broken down into distinct elements to make it easier to analyze and tweak through targeted programs. But to address the problem of social capital is to enter into the complexity of poverty and see how approaches that ignore social capital actually rob disadvantaged groups of the coherence of their experience.
Here is why social capital is so important: You could have two people with exactly the same income who actually live very different lives based on the different social networks they have. For some, achieving upward mobility is a perfectly compatible, even expected, progression within their networks and lifelong relationships. Being a part of their family and maintaining strong relationships with loved ones basically means moving up the economic and social ladder. When hard times hit, they have the support structure they need to get back on their feet. For others, achieving upward mobility means separating themselves from family and loved ones, which may cause them to lack the connections and support they need to withstand an economic crisis.
The breakdown of the social bonds in American communities actually hurts the poor the most. Many people talk about inequality, but this study shows that the problem is not inequality but a lack of economic and social inclusion. Social capital is intertwined with family structure since adults in two-parent families have a much easier time devoting themselves to the kinds of activities that build social capital in a neighborhood. Social capital is also closely correlated to access to quality schools, which leads to the fourth community factor that fosters upward mobility.
4. Access to Quality Schools
Though it is certainly not a new finding, Chetty and his colleagues found that poor kids are far more likely to succeed if they have access to high quality education. Though the study does not mention the need for school choice, it is clearly a necessity by the fact that too many schools are providing a poor education to children who have no other options available to them.
GCO believes that the best and most effective way to provide access to high quality education for children from low-income households is through a variety of school choice initiatives, particularly Education Savings Accounts (ESAs) and Tuition Tax Credit Programs. Throwing more money at failing schools that lack competition and the ability to innovate is not the solution.
Conclusion
The study by Chetty et al. has a lot of other interesting findings worthy of consideration, but the four community characteristics that have been mentioned – two-parent families, racial and economic integration, social capital, and access to quality schools – are the ones with the strongest and most consistent correlation with upward mobility. These factors help to set those cloistered and marginalized from mainstream norms on a pathway to opportunity.
At GCO, we are committed to addressing limited social mobility in Georgia. We seek to identify barriers to opportunity and promote legislative, policy, and community solutions that allow people to achieve middle class by middle age. Our hope is that Georgia and America at large will once again become a “land of opportunity” for all people.
by Georgia Center for Opportunity | Apr 20, 2015
I recently attended a conference that included a number of participants who have thought deeply about religious freedom and have acted effectively in its defense. Naturally, everyone was talking about the high-profile legislative battle in Indiana. That got me thinking about what might and should happen in Georgia, during next year’s legislative session, when protecting religious freedom will once again be on the table.
In the unlikely event that you’ve forgotten, here’s what a typical religious freedom bill—modeled on the 1993 federal legislation that Congress passed virtually unanimously—purports to do. In the first instance, it reestablishes a standard the Supreme Court employed to deal with a number of cases under the First Amendment: if a plaintiff can show that his or her religious freedom is substantially burdened by a generally applicable law, then the government has to demonstrate that the law is intended to carry out a compelling state interest and show that it is the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. Contrary to what its opponents claimed, the law does not give anyone a license to discriminate on the basis of religion; rather, it reinstates a time-honored judicial balancing test. Judges decide whether religious freedom—our “first freedom”—or the state interest prevails. No responsible advocate of religious freedom thinks that it ought to prevail against every possible countervailing claim, that every state interest ought to give way before it. We simply insist that religious freedom is an important consideration that ought to be taken into account.
The substance of the law
In the light of what happened in Indiana, Arkansas, and here in Georgia, it seems highly unlikely that any state legislature will pass a simple and straightforward version of the 1993 federal legislation. Opponents were all too effective in tying religious freedom to discrimination, even in the absence of any evidence that the federal law or its many state counterparts had ever effectively been used to license or justify discrimination. Unfortunately, the “fix” that lawmakers adopted to respond to these objections tends to sweep much too widely, making state and local anti-discrimination rules in effect trumps against any religious freedom claim. While certainly a permissible (if, I would argue, inadvisable) declaration of a compelling state interest, it appears to leave no room for certain sorts of religious freedom claims. Thus, for example, a church or other faith-based organization might wish to engage in mission-based hiring, employing only those willing to live up to certain creedal or behavioral standards. These religious hiring rights have long been acknowledged or accommodated in law, but could be described as “discrimination” by those unsympathetic to the standards or practices at issue. Without explicit provision for them in the law, these traditional religious hiring rights could be deprived any any sort of religious freedom defense.
Then there is, of course, the wedding industry, where some practitioners have absolutely no objection to serving gays in ordinary circumstances, but cannot in good conscience provide their services to a same-sex wedding ceremony. Their critics treat their services as public accommodations, akin to restaurants and hotels, and insist that there is absolutely no difference between the photographer who is happy to do a portrait of any individual or family, but not of any wedding ceremony, and the racist hotelier or restaurateur who refuses to serve African-Americans under any circumstances. In the first instance, this argument stretches the notion of public accommodation far beyond its traditional bounds. Furthermore, while the experience of African-Americans in the Jim Crow South certainly made it clear that the traditional right of a businessperson to serve whomever he or she pleases (an aspect of freedom of association) has to give way to the norm of non-discrimination in matters of race, it is far from clear that gays who seek wedding services are similarly seriously discommoded by the few bakers, photographers, or wedding planners who have religious scruples about same-sex marriage. Common sense tells you that there is a difference between being unable to find a place to stay or eat, or having to go around the corner or to the next town to find a wedding photographer. What’s more, many wedding-related businesses are, to say the least, “closely-held.” That means that exempting them from anti-discrimination laws in this limited instance—not, to repeat, in ordinary circumstances—rests on the solid constitutional ground of the recent Supreme Court decision in the Hobby Lobby case; the Court there held that family businesses, at least, enjoyed the protection of the First Amendment and the federal RFRA. Finally, at the very least both baking and photography can be treated as arts, hence as forms of expression. It has long been the understanding that the First Amendment prohibits government (or individuals using governmental authority) from compelling people to say what is not on their minds.
There is, in other words, a reasonably strong argument that the “fix” proposed in Georgia trenches on traditional freedoms of religion, association, and expression. While no one would argue that these freedoms are or should be absolute, they should not be casually or thoughtlessly trampled in an effort to conciliate the demands of one intense constituency. I leave it to the legislative drafters to find language that affirms both compelling norms—religious freedom and non-discrimination—and finds a way to combine them coherently. Surely we are not so unreasonable and inept that we cannot come up with language that accommodates religious liberty and assures gays and lesbians that they will neither be denied service in ordinary circumstances nor be too inconvenienced In their search for wedding services. (Indeed, there are “conscience clauses” from the medical field that may offer a good model here: those who have conscientious objections to, say, abortion, can be excused from participating in a medically necessary abortion, so long as someone else stands ready to help with the procedure.)
Making the case for a reasonable religious freedom law
This year, I think advocates of religious freedom legislation were taken somewhat by surprise by the scope and character of the opposition to them. Since religious freedom had almost always been an “apple pie” issue, they may have thought that, especially in a state that is generally both conservative and religious, opposition would be either nominal or relatively easily overcome. They didn’t reckon on the vociferousness of those who frequently misrepresented the proposal, on the almost complicitous supineness (or was it alacrity?) with which the media gave them a megaphone, and on the unwillingness of the business community to protect religious liberty, not to mention the enterprises and livelihoods of their much smaller brethren. Next year promises to be worse, not only because opponents of religious freedom legislation will be emboldened by their success this year, but because it is very likely that a narrowly-divided Supreme Court will hand down a decision finding a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, raising passions even higher.
Proponents of religious freedom can’t afford merely to be reactive. We have to start right away to lay the groundwork for success in next year’s legislative session. That means making a winsome case in public for the necessity of such legislation, not simply to protect those who conscientiously dissent from same-sex marriage, but also all those—especially members of minority religions—who in carrying out their religious duties find themselves on the wrong side of an otherwise neutral law. Those in the media who cover this issue must also be educated, again in a setting where the stakes are not high and they can feel free to ask questions and engage in the give-and-take of a conversation. That also means sitting down with legislators when things are relatively calm and patiently explaining the importance of religious freedom and the nuts and bolts of protecting it. Finally, that means putting business leaders on notice that if they criticize religious freedom legislation as unwelcoming in our state, they will be pointedly asked about the business they do in countries all over the world that do not respect human rights, let alone the rights of gays and lesbians.
Once the session begins, proponents of religious freedom legislation have to be prepared immediately to answer distortions of the bill’s provisions and purpose. They also have to be prepared to call out zealots on their side, demanding the same responsible behavior of their opponents.
I remain confident that a bill can and will pass, but it is unlikely to be a cakewalk. The arguments are on our side, but critics of the legislation command the high ground in the media.
The future of religious freedom
Abraham Lincoln once said, “In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed. Consequently he who moulds public sentiment, goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions.” Laws can be enacted, and then repealed. Even constitutional provisions can be repealed or reinterpreted. We cannot rest content that by the enactment of a law, we have genuinely and for the long term protected religious freedom.
More important than any law is “the culture,” by which I mean not only the arts, media, and education, but also the complex web of organizations and relationship that constitute “civil society” and the deeper sources in history and principle for public opinion. If these institutions, understandings, and “habits of the heart” do not support religious freedom, then no law purporting to protect it will stand for long.
Our long-term task is thus one of cultural restoration and reconstruction, in which politics plays only a small part. To be sure, laws and political controversies can offer so-called “teachable moments,” when lots of people are paying attention, but most of the teaching will be done in other, often more intimate and less fraught settings, like schools, churches, families, neighborhoods, and workplace relationships. And most of the teaching will not, strictly speaking, be about religious liberty.
Some have suggested that cultural and religious conservatives should be prepared for a “Benedict option,” a time of withdrawal from “the world” in order insularly to protect themselves, their families and communities, and their understanding from an inveterately hostile culture. I’m not yet prepared to urge my fellows down that path. I have more confidence that truth and nature will assert or reassert themselves. (I could make such an argument using the language of Christian theology, but would prefer in this venue not to talk about creation, evil, and God’s sovereignty.)
What we have to do is be attentive to building healthy families and communities, to be vigilant about telling the truth about ourselves and our relationships, to be open to respectful engagement with those who disagree with us, and to tell and promote stories in art, film, music, and literature that teach moral truths without being overtly “preachy.” Great art and great literature command the attention of those who encounter them. They nourish our minds and our souls. They provide the bases for fruitful conversations and friendships, even among those who happen at the moment to disagree.
This isn’t a “quick fix,” but rather the work of many lifetimes. We didn’t lose our way overnight. We won’t find our way back tomorrow.
Image Credit: https://humanitiesusa.wordpress.com/2011/05/15/norman-rockwell-freedom-of-speech-the-saturday-evening-post-c-1943/
by Georgia Center for Opportunity | Apr 20, 2015
The John Jay Institute and Georgia Center for Opportunity co-hosted a lecture held at Whitefield Academy in Mableton, GA, last Thursday titled “C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, and the Great War.” The lecture was given by Dr. Joseph Loconte, an Associate Professor of History at The King’s College in New York.
In his lecture, Dr. Loconte brilliantly demonstrates how the Great War (WWI) shaped both C.S. Lewis and J.R.R. Tolkien’s outlook on the world, who were both soldiers in the war and experienced the horror of the deadliest conflict known to man up to that era. He reveals how the war’s impact can be seen in these author’s extraordinary works of literature, drawing from examples in the Chronicles of Narnia and The Lord of the Rings to highlight ways in which the authors weave in themes of friendship, noble sacrifice, the corruption of power, and the necessity of grace to overcome the power of evil.
Of special interest is the way in which these two men’s close friendship impacted their writing and set them apart from other writers and poets of their day, a number of whom became disillusioned by the evils they saw in the world. Lewis and Tolkien’s works provide an air of hope amid the sad reality of war and suffering, which stemmed from their belief in the redemption that is still to come.
Watch the lecture here:
C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, and the Great War – Part I
C.S. Lewis, J.R.R. Tolkien, and the Great War – Part II
Image credit:
http://www.gospelherald.com/articles/51973/20140721/j-r-r-tolkien-and-c-s-lewis-friendship-documented-in-new-easter-film.htm (featured image)
http://www.cslewisinstitute.org/CS_Lewis_and_JRR_Tolkien_page2 (in the post)
by Georgia Center for Opportunity | Apr 15, 2015
This is the second entry in a series of posts highlighting GCO’s report, A High Price to Pay: Recommendations for Minimizing Debt’s Role in Driving Recidivism Rates. The first entry provided an overview of the report, as well as a recent update to one of the recommendations.
Returning citizens often face a mountain of debt upon leaving prison that makes it more difficult to successfully reenter society. Some of this debt may have existed prior to incarceration – such as consumer debt and child support – while much of it arises as a direct result of a criminal conviction, and is made much worse by subsequent incarceration and unemployment. Studies have shown average debt amounts in certain jurisdictions to be as high as $20,000 in child support arrears[i] and between $500 and $2,000 in offense-related debt.[ii] This onerous amount of debt, combined with the lack of opportunity to earn or save money while in prison, cause many offenders to reenter society with little hope of being able to repay what they owe.
Consumer Debt
It is common for people who are incarcerated to carry some level of consumer debt into prison, whether it is from outstanding mortgages, car loans, school loans, or credit cards.[iii] Missed payments on these mortgages, loans, and bills result in back interest, fees, and fines accumulating over the course of a person’s incarceration. The end result can be the offender accumulating an unmanageable amount of debt by the time he or she is released, leading him or her to file for bankruptcy.[iv]
Child Support
Child support typically comprises the largest debt returning citizens owe,[v] as non-custodial parents who are unable to modify their orders during incarceration can owe tens of thousands of dollars in arrears by the time they are released.[vi]
One study examining Massachusetts’ inmates and parolees revealed that non-custodial parents entering prison owed an average of $10,543 in unpaid child support and were likely to generate an additional $10,000 in arrears by the time they were released.[vii] More startlingly, one-fifth of the state inmates were estimated to generate arrears balances in excess of $30,000 while in prison.[viii] Another study of 350 parolees in Colorado demonstrated that they had an average balance of $16,651 in arrears.[ix]
Many returning citizens in Georgia are likely to be impacted by child support debt, as 60 percent of offenders in Georgia self-report having one or more children upon entering prison.[x] Accepting the circumstances of the incarcerated, some states allow offenders to modify their child support while in prison to avoid the accrual of arrears. However, Georgia offenders are prohibited from modifying their arrears while incarcerated, as the state deems incarceration to be a form of “voluntary unemployment.”[xi] As such, there is no mechanism for indigent offenders in Georgia to avoid accruing child support debt.
Once child support arrears have accrued, federal law requires non-custodial parents to pay the full amount owed to custodial parents, even if modification of orders is granted upon release from prison.[xii] However, federal law does permit arrears owed to the state to be forgiven retroactively. Child support arrears become owed to the state when the Department of Human Resources supplies Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) to custodial parents who are not receiving requisite child support payments from non-custodial parents. Once funds are distributed, the non-custodial parent becomes obligated to repay the state for supplying the amount of assistance he or she was originally responsible for paying the custodial parent.[xiii]
Restitution
Another source of debt which many returning citizens owe upon reentry is payment of restitution to victims. The amount of restitution owed by offenders usually ranges from several hundreds of dollars to several thousands of dollars, depending on the offense.[xiv] Restitution provides a way for offenders to pay for financial loss and other damages suffered by victims including lost property, medical expenses, costs of counseling, funeral and burial expenses, and lost wages.[xv] It also serves as a way for the offender and the state to demonstrate that they recognize the harm that the victim suffered and the offender’s obligation to make amends.[xvi] One study conducted in Pennsylvania found that paying restitution is related to lower recidivism.[xvii] As such, it is an important obligation for returning citizens to pay.
However, problems occur when a person’s financial status and earning capacity is not considered in forming restitution orders.[xviii] This can result in unrealistic terms of repayment being formed, which, combined with other court-imposed financial obligations, create a financial burden for the returning citizen and may discourage him or her from repaying anything at all.[xix] When this situation happens, it leaves victims without compensation for financial loss or damages and diminishes their confidence in the criminal justice system.
In Georgia, the Crime Victims Restitution Act of 2005 mandates that offenders make restitution payments to victims while under parole supervision.[xx] The court determines the amount of restitution and manner of paying it during sentencing, and parole officers are responsible for facilitating and monitoring payment compliance once the offender is in the community. Parolees must begin paying restitution upon release and are required to pay a minimum of $30 per month. [1],[xxi]
Fees, Fines, and Surcharges
A third source of debt that encumbers returning citizens is fees, fines, and surcharges that arise as a direct result of a criminal conviction.
Fees are amounts charged to offenders in exchange for the services provided by courts, probation departments, parole supervision, and other agencies.[xxii] For example, the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles collects a monthly supervision fee of $30 from every parolee with a supervision period of three months or longer. [2],[xxiii]
Fines imposed by the court are intended to punish offenders and deter others from committing such crimes.[xxiv] The amount of the fine varies based on the person’s charge and can be mandatory or discretionary.[xxv] A fine for a third DUI offense in Georgia, for instance, can be as high as $5,000.[xxvi]
Finally, surcharges are add-on amounts often unrelated to the crime but used to generate revenue for criminal justice agencies.[xxvii] Revenue is designated toward such things as retirement funds for sheriffs and peace officers, law enforcement facilities and training, indigent defense programs, and education and treatment programs.[xxviii] While small in isolation, surcharges can total hundreds and even thousands of dollars.[xxix]
Georgia began collecting surcharges in 1950 when the legislature passed a statute requiring a deduction to be taken from every criminal fine to support the Peace Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund. By 2001, the number of court-imposed surcharges had risen to 21 to support nine state programs, five local programs, and the State General Fund.[xxx] Surcharges range from $0.50 per case to 50 percent of the total fine amount.[xxxi]
Inability to Earn or Save Money in Prison
A fourth reason returning citizens in Georgia have difficulty repaying debts upon release is that they do not have the ability to earn money for their work performed while incarcerated.[xxxii] As one of only three states that do not pay inmates for work,[3][xxxiii] Georgia bars those who are indigent from being able to meet current obligations, pay-down debt, or save for their inevitable reentry while in prison. This policy removes a strong incentive for them to work and develop skills and experience that will be helpful in obtaining a job upon release.
Conclusion
Without having a realistic plan and payment options to pay-off all of this debt, people returning from prison are less likely to pay anything at all, more likely to engage in the underground economy to avoid wage garnishment, and more likely to make bad decisions that may result in re-incarceration. The consequences of debt can be detrimental for returning citizens.
Footnotes
[1] Payment is required upon release for parolees serving 90 days or more under parole supervision.
[2] Parolees serving for violent offenses pay a monthly victim compensation fee of $30 in lieu of the supervision fee.
[3] Georgia inmates who participate in the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program (PIECP) and inmates who are placed in a transitional center are the exception, as they do have a chance to earn money while incarcerated. However, PIECP is limited to two prisons – though the state has plans to expand it to three to five more prisons – and there are only 13 transitional centers across the state serving 2,674 of 53,558 inmates . The other two states who do not pay inmates for work are Arkansas and Texas.
Endnotes
Some of the citations listed below are abbreviated. To view the full citation, see the “Notes” section in our report, A High Price to Pay.
[i] Nancy Thoennes, Child Support Profile: Massachusetts Incarcerated and Paroled Parents, Center for Policy Research, May 2002, 26, http://cntrpolres.qwestoffice.net/reports/profile%20of%20CS%20among%20incarcerated%20&%20paroled%20parents.pdf.
[ii] Carl Reynolds et al., A Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Restitution, and Child Support are Assessed and Collected from People Convicted of Crimes, Council of State Governments Justice Center and the Texas Office of Court Administration, Interim Report, March 2, 2009, 8, http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/2009-CSG-TXOCA-report.pdf.
[iii] Erica Sandberg, “Ex-offenders face big debt challenges after prison,” CreditCards.com, August 30, 2010, accessed May 8, 2014, para. 7, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/ex-offenders-felons-prisoners-jail-in-debt-1264.php.
[iv] Connie Prater, “How to prepare financially for time in prison,” CreditCards.com, October 15, 2010, accessed March 26, 2014, para. 7, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/how-to-prepare-inmate-financially-jail-prison-1265.php.
[v] Carl Reynolds et al., A Framework to Improve, 10.
[vi] Nancy Thoennes, Child Support Profile, 18.
[vii] Ibid., 26.
[viii] Ibid.
[ix] Jessica Pearson, “Building Debt While Doing Time: Child Support and Incarceration,” Judge’s Journal 43 (2004): 7; Jessica Pearson and Lanae Davis, Serving Parents Who Leave Prison: Final Report on the Work and Family Center, Center for Policy Research, 2001, ii, http://www.hawaii.edu/hivandaids/Serving%20Parents%20Who%20Leave%20Prison.pdf.
[x] Georgia Department of Corrections, Inmate Statistical Profile, 8.
[xi] Office of Child Support Enforcement, “Project to Avoid Increasing Delinquencies: ’Voluntary Unemployment,’ Imputed Income, and Modification Laws and Policies for Incarcerated Noncustodial Parents,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, July 2012, 4, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/programs/css/paid_no_4_companion.pdf; See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(j).
[xii] Jessica Pearson, “Building Debt,” 5.
[xiii] Rachel L. McLean and Michael D. Thompson, Repaying Debts, Council of State Governments Justice Center, 2007, 26, http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/repaying_debts_full_report-2.pdf.
[xiv] Judge Brian Amero, Henry County Superior Court, telephone conversation with author, May 29, 2014.
[xv] National Center for Victims of Crime, “Restitution Procedures,” in Promising Practices and Strategies for Victim Services in Corrections, 1997, http://www.victimsofcrime.org/library/publications/archive/promising-practices-and-strategies-for-victim-services-in-corrections; National Center for Victims of Crime, Making Restitution Real: Five Case Studies on Improving Restitution Collection, 2011, 3, 4, http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/2011-Natl-Center-for-Victims-of-Crime-report.pdf.
[xvi] National Center for Victims of Crime, Making Restitution Real, 4.
[xvii] R. Barry Ruback, Restitution in Pennsylvania: A Multimethod Investigation, Submitted to Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, Final Grant Report, August 2002, 9, 98, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Archive/221282NCJRS.pdf.
[xviii] National Institute of Justice, “Restitution,” Archived material that is the product of five regional symposia held on restorative justice between June 1997 and January 1998, accessed April 9, 2014, para. 5, http://nij.gov/topics/courts/restorative-justice/promising-practices/Pages/restitution.aspx.
[xix] Carl Reynolds et al., A Framework to Improve, 1.
[xx] Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, “Restitution,” accessed April 10, 2014, http://pap.georgia.gov/restitution.
[xxi] Ibid.
[xxii] Rachel L. McLean and Michael D. Thompson, Repaying Debts, 2; Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, “Supervision & Victim Fees,” accessed April 10, 2014, http://pap.georgia.gov/supervision-victim-fees.
[xxiii] Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, “Supervision & Victim Fees,” accessed May 12, 2014, http://pap.georgia.gov/supervision-victim-fees.
[xxiv] Paul Peterson, “Supervision Fees: State Policies and Practices,” Federal Probation 76 (2012): para. 2, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2012-06/supervision.html.
[xxv] Rachel L. McLean and Michael D. Thompson, Repaying Debts, 2.
[xxvi] O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391.
[xxvii] Rachel L. McLean and Michael D. Thompson, Repaying Debts, 2.
[xxviii] Administrative Office of the Courts, Court Fees in Georgia – Laws and Information, Court Business and Process Improvement Program, October 2004, 5, http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/publications/courtfeesbook10_2004.pdf.
[xxix] Alicia Bannon, Mitali Nagrecha, and Rebekah Diller, Criminal Justice Debt: A Barrier to Reentry, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law, 2010, 1, http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf.
[xxx] Russell W. Hinton, “Court Fees,” Department of Audits and Accounts, Performance Audit Operations Division, October 2001, 1. This executive summary can be found in the following report: Administrative Office of the Courts of Georgia, Municipal Court Fee Study, November 2003, Appendix A-1, http://www.georgiacourts.org/aoc/publications/municipal_court.pdf.
[xxxi] Ibid.
[xxxii] Adam Crisp, “Georgia inmates strike in fight for pay,” timesfreepress.com, December 14, 2010, accessed May 20, 2014, http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2010/dec/14/georgia-inmates-strike-in-fight-for-pay/?local.
[xxxiii] Cindy Upton and Sarah Harp, Cost of Incarcerating Adult Felons, Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, Program Review and Investigations Committee, Research Report No. 373, 45, http://www.lrc.ky.gov/lrcpubs/RR373.pdf; A.J. Sabree, Strategic Planning and Implementation Consultant for the Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice, email message to author, June 5, 2014; Peter Wagner, “Section III: The Prison Economy,” in The Prison Index: Taking the Pulse of the Crime Control Industry, Western Prison Project and the Prison Policy Initiative, April 2003, 130-131, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/prisonindex/prisonlabor.html; Adam Crisp, “Georgia inmates strike in fight for pay,” timesfreepress.com, December 14, 2010, http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2010/dec/14/georgia-inmates-strike-in-fight-for-pay/?local.
